AUSTRALIAN VETERINARY EMERGENCY PLAN

# AUSVETPLAN

# Guidance document

# Risk-based assessment of disease control options for rare and valuable animals

Version 5.1

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In this manual, text placed in square brackets [xxx] indicates that that aspect of the manual remains unresolved or is under development; such text is not part of the official manual. The issues will be further worked on by experts and relevant text included at a future date.

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**EMERGENCY ANIMAL DISEASE WATCH HOTLINE: 1800 675 888**

**The Emergency Animal Disease Watch Hotline is a toll-free telephone number that connects callers to the relevant state or territory officer to report concerns about any potential emergency disease situation. Anyone suspecting an emergency disease outbreak should use this number to get immediate advice and assistance.**

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Version 1.0, 2016

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# Contents

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 This document

### 1.1.1 Purpose

As part of AUSVETPLAN (the Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan), this guidance document has been developed to assist personnel involved in an emergency animal disease (EAD) response to understand the principles for defining rare and valuable animals (RVAs) and assessing the risks of disease exposure and transmission for diseases that are listed in the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA).[1]

Together with the other components of AUSVETPLAN, this guidance document has been developed to help ensure that an efficient, effective and coherent response can be implemented consistently across Australia with minimal delay.

### 1.1.2 Scope

This guidance document provides the principles for defining RVAs, and assessing the risks of disease exposure and transmission for diseases that are listed in the EADRA. The document may also provide useful principles for responses to new and emerging diseases.

This document only applies to EAD responses and not to any other situation where regulatory measures may be imposed (eg issues arising from animals legally or illegally imported into Australia).

### 1.1.3 Development

This guidance document has been produced in accordance with the procedures described in the **AUSVETPLAN *Overview*** and in consultation with Australian national, state and territory governments; the relevant livestock industries; nongovernment agencies; and public health authorities, where relevant.

In this manual, text placed in square brackets [xxx] indicates that that aspect of the manual remains unresolved or is under development; such text is not part of the official manual. The issues will be further worked on by experts and relevant text included at a future date.

## 1.2 Other documentation

This guidance document should be read and implemented in conjunction with:

- Other AUSVETPLAN documents, including the response strategies; operational, enterprise and management manuals; and, any relevant guidance and resource documents. The complete series of manuals is available on the Animal Health Australia website.[2]
- Relevant nationally agreed standard operating procedures (NASOPs)[3]. These procedures complement AUSVETPLAN and describe in detail specific actions undertaken during a response

[1] https://animalhealthaustralia.com.au/what-we-do/emergency-animal-disease/ead-response-agreement/
[2] https://animalhealthaustralia.com.au/ausvetplan/
[3] https:// animalhealthaustralia.com.au/nationally-agreed-standard-operating-procedures/

to an incident. NASOPs have been developed for use by jurisdictions during responses to emergency animal disease (EAD) incidents and emergencies.

- Relevant jurisdictional or industry policies, response plans, standard operating procedures and work instructions
- Relevant Commonwealth and jurisdictional legislation; and, legal agreements (such as the EADRA, where applicable).

## 1.3 Training resources

**EAD preparedness and response arrangements in Australia**

The EAD Foundation Online course[4] provides livestock producers, veterinarians, veterinary students, government personnel and emergency workers with foundation knowledge for further training in EAD preparedness and response in Australia.

[4] https://animalhealthaustralia.com.au/online-training-courses/

# 2 Rare and valuable animals

## 2.1 Definition of rare and valuable animals

The classification 'rare and valuable animal' (RVA) applies to the following susceptible animals:

- breeding nuclei[5] of rare domesticated animal breeds that are listed on the Rare Breeds Trust of Australia priority list; this does not include nonbreeding individuals (e.g. wethers or steers, or individuals too old to breed)
- threatened species and subspecies; this includes species listed by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES); species on the International Union for the Conservation of Nature Red List of Threatened Species; and species listed under the *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999*, and in complementary state or territory threatened species lists
- species on the managed species program list of the Zoo and Aquarium Association
- irreplaceable animals — individuals of high monetary value or other unique status (such as genetic value) whose replacement cannot reasonably be achieved because of limited global availability or import restrictions (eg research animal colonies)
- famous or socially iconic individual animals, as requested by a recognised organisation at the state or territory jurisdictional level that has a demonstrated interest in the animal (eg famous race horses, as requested by the jurisdictional racing authority)
- animals with demonstrable specialised skills or attributes (eg animal actors, airport bird control raptors, public performance animals, detection dogs), as requested by a recognised organisation that has a demonstrated interest in the animal (eg with regard to detection dogs, the jurisdictional border protection authority or police)
- assistance animals that fulfil the criteria of the *Disability Discrimination Act 1992* or have been trained under a program accredited with recognised organisations[6] or recognised under state or territory legislation.

Individual companion animals may be assessed on a case-by-case basis, depending on available resources.

## 2.2 RVAs in an EAD incident

RVAs are afforded a special status by their owners or the community in general. RVAs may not pose the same risks of exposure to, and transmission of, disease as other animals. They may also be managed differently from other susceptible animals. RVAs represent a specific area of risk that, if not addressed sensitively and with apparent fairness, can undermine a local response and have wider ramifications that are greater than the disease risk posed by the animals themselves.

[5] A breeding nucleus is the number of animals required to ensure a sustainable population for the premises. See Appendix 1 for definitions of breeding nuclei for the major livestock genera.
[6] Recognised organisations include the International Guide Dog Federation and Assistance Dogs International.

Owners and managers of RVAs need to be aware of the disease risks their animals pose. Owners should implement appropriate contingency measures and biosecurity to mitigate risks to the individual animal, and to wider animal and human health.

Owners of RVAs may be aligned with industry organisations that contribute to a cost-shared EAD response. These organisations need to consider their response to what may be seen by their mainstream members as special treatment and a potential threat to the success of an EAD response.

## 2.3 Example scenarios where RVA status may be relevant

- Where protective vaccination is not part of the agreed control strategy but is considered to be relevant to the protection of nondomestic species in a regional managed breeding program.
- Where a destruction order has been issued for animals on a premises that holds recognised rare livestock breeds.
- Where the application of prevention measures such as vaccination or restrictions on specific food components cannot be practically implemented without significant risk to the health and welfare of an RVA population.

Where appropriate technologies exist, such as frozen semen or embryos, breeders of RVAs should be encouraged to put in place appropriate genetic contingencies. It is recognised that assisted reproductive technologies are not widely applicable to nondomestic species, thus placing greater value on the live animal.

# 3 Assessing disease control options

## 3.1 Assessment principles

- Management of RVAs must not pose an unacceptable risk to human or animal health during an EAD response, to disease control or to proof-of-freedom surveillance.
- The owner of the RVA is responsible for applying for assessment of variation of the disease control measures to be applied to the animals during the response.
- Although applications for variations to disease control measures for RVAs will be considered during an EAD response, this guidance does not guarantee that all applications for such variations on the grounds of RVA status will be successful.
- The outcomes of assessments conducted on similar animals and situations may change during the course of a response.
- Because disease responses differ, the assessments and procedures detailed in this guidance are not prescriptive and do not necessarily represent policy for EAD control.
- Demonstration of infection status and immunity involves a great deal of uncertainty and may require expert advice on the availability of diagnostic tests and their validity in the species under consideration.
- Assessment for protective vaccination will be progressed only if the vaccine required is currently permitted for use in Australia.
- The outcome of assessment of an RVA application for variation to disease control measures may be subject to higher-level agreement by the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases (CCEAD). Where disease control measures are time critical and a final approval for their variation has not been received at the relevant control centre by the time the measures must be implemented, the measures should proceed.

## 3.2 Risk factors to consider

Table 1 summarises the risk factors that are expected to affect whether alternative management to that agreed for non-RVAs (eg as recommended in the relevant AUSVETPLAN Disease Strategy) may be accepted. The list addresses risks associated with the animal, the disease agent, operational issues and protective vaccination.

**Table 1 Risk factors to consider**

| Factor | Favours alternative management | Does not favour alternative management |
|---|---|---|
| **Animal factors** | | |
| Infection status of animals | Animals are demonstrated not to be infected | Animals are demonstrated to be infected |
| Likelihood of exposure and infection | Animals have a low likelihood of exposure and infection | Animals have a high likelihood of exposure and infection |
| Susceptibility of species — relevant where agreed policy applies to genera or broader taxonomic classifications | Species is known not to be susceptible to infection | Species is known to be susceptible to infection, or susceptibility of species is not known |
| Epidemiological role of species in disease transmission | If infected, species is unlikely to transmit infection | Species is known to transmit infection |
| Number and location of animals | Individual animal, or in a region with low density of animals | Large numbers of animals, or in a region with high density of animals |
| Presence of concurrent disease | No significant concurrent disease | Concurrent disease present |
| Clinical disease exhibited | Clinical disease is easy to detect in the species | Clinical disease is inapparent in the species |
| **Disease agent factors** | | |
| Infects humans | Disease is not a risk to public health | Disease is a significant public health risk |
| Mode of transmission | Disease is not spread by direct contact or fomites (eg vector-borne diseases) | Disease is spread by direct contact and fomites |
| Incubation period | Long | Short |
| Infectious period | Short | Long |
| **Operational factors** | | |

| Factor | Favours alternative management | Does not favour alternative management |
|---|---|---|
| AUSVETPLAN status of premises | Animals are on 'low-risk premises' (i.e. premises of relevance or at-risk premises) | Animals are on 'high-risk premises' (i.e. infected premises, dangerous contact premises, suspect premises or trace premises) |
| Ability to monitor and conduct surveillance on the animals | Animals are under regular observation | Animals are not under regular observation |
| Availability of appropriate diagnostic tests | Diagnostic tests have been validated in the species, with appropriate sensitivity and specificity | Diagnostic tests have not been validated in the species, or have low sensitivity and specificity |
| Ability to identify animals in the short and long term | Animals are permanently identifiable | Animals are not identifiable |
| Traceability | Animals can be recorded in a national traceability system (eg NLIS, stud book, zoo information management system) | No national traceability system exists |
| Biosecurity on premises | High | Low |
| Availability of resources for managing movement controls, issuing permits, tracing and surveillance, and vaccination | Available | Limited |
| Stage of outbreak | Later in outbreak, when disease is under control, and extent and epidemiology are better understood | Earlier in outbreak, when disease is not under control, and extent and mode of transmission are uncertain |
| Proof-of-freedom surveillance and risk to Australia's market access | Alternative management of RVAs would not affect Australia's proof-of freedom-status and market access | Alternative management of RVAs may affect Australia's proof-of-freedom status and market access |
| Willingness and capacity of RVA owner or manager to comply | Owner or manager is willing and able to fully participate and comply | Owner or manager is not willing or has limited capacity to comply |
| **Factors specific for protective vaccination** | | |

| Factor | Favours alternative management | Does not favour alternative management |
|---|---|---|
| Availability of vaccine | Sufficient supplies of vaccine are available and permitted for use in Australia | Insufficient supplies of vaccine are available, or vaccine is not permitted for use in Australia |
| Human resources to vaccinate and manage other requirements | Sufficient human resources are available | Insufficient human resources are available |
| Resources to support additional surveillance requirements | Sufficient resources are available | Insufficient resources are available |
| Effectiveness of vaccine | Vaccination is likely to be effective in the species | Vaccination is unlikely to be effective in the species |
| Risks of administration to animal or humans (eg injury through handling) | Administration can be done safely | Administration poses an unacceptable risk of injury to the animal or humans |
| Ability to detect infection in vaccinated animals | Infection is likely to be detected in the vaccinated animals (eg through clinical surveillance, virological monitoring or serology). This should be documented in a surveillance and monitoring plan | Infection is unlikely to be detected in the vaccinated animals |
| Management of biosecurity for vaccination team | Biosecurity risks can be managed appropriately | Biosecurity risks cannot be managed appropriately |
| Ability to achieve desired herd immunity | Desired herd immunity can be achieved in the vaccinated population. This may require post-vaccination monitoring | Desired herd immunity is unlikely to be achieved in the vaccinated population |

NLIS = National Livestock Identification System; RVA = rare and valuable animal

# 4 Decision tools

## 4.1 General assumptions

- The application has been deemed eligible — that is, the animals involved are accepted to be RVAs and are subject to disease control measures.
- Variations to nationally agreed disease control strategies may require CCEAD endorsement and National Management Group (NMG) approval.

## 4.2 Assessment specific to request for protective vaccination

It is assumed that an effective vaccine exists, and its practical application to, and safety for, the species involved have been considered by the owner.

Protective vaccination may be requested for RVAs to minimise illness, death or negative welfare resulting from the disease or the standard disease control measures. An important consideration will be the impact of use of vaccine on the broader response, including subsequent surveillance and proof-of freedom testing. Other important factors will be vaccine availability and registration, and the availability of resources to manage and administer vaccines.

Figure 1 shows a decision tree for protective vaccination of RVAs in an EAD outbreak.




CCEAD = Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases; NMG = National Management Group

**Figure 1 Decision tree for protective vaccination of rare and valuable animals in an emergency animal disease outbreak**

## 4.3 Assessment specific to vaccination exemption for threatened species RVAs

Exemption from compulsory vaccination may be requested because of practicalities or animal welfare considerations relating to vaccination of RVAs. Factors to consider include the impacts of a nonimmune population within a vaccinated area on the vaccination strategy, ongoing surveillance activities and management of stakeholder perceptions. There may also be ramifications for proof of freedom and subsequent market access.

Figure 2 shows a decision tree for exemption from vaccination for RVAs.




**a** Alternative measures may include enhanced monitoring and surveillance, biosecurity and movement controls, and identification and traceability.

**Figure 2 Decision tree for exemption from vaccination of rare and valuable animals in an emergency animal disease outbreak**

## 4.4 Assessment specific to exemption from destruction

A prioritised set of RVAs considered essential for the enterprise or breed may be nominated for exemption from destruction. The RVAs would be on an infected premises or dangerous contact premises. Any exemption should not jeopardise future proof of freedom.

The objective of the assessment is to establish whether the population, either directly or after reasonable conditions are imposed, represents an ongoing risk to the response. Disease transmission risk is the key technical consideration; others include ongoing surveillance requirements and the practicalities of maintaining any conditions imposed on the exempted RVAs. Any exemption will also require careful communication and management of stakeholder perceptions on an ongoing basis.

Figure 3 shows a decision tree for exemption from destruction for RVAs.




**a** Alternative measures may include enhanced monitoring and surveillance, biosecurity and movement controls, identification and traceability, and vaccination.

**Figure 3 Decision tree for exemption from destruction of rare and valuable animals in an emergency animal disease outbreak**

## 4.5 Assessment specific to variation to movement controls for nondomestic RVAs

Variation to movement controls, on a case-by-case basis, may be requested to minimise negative impacts on welfare or facilitate breeding in nondomestic RVAs. Variation to movement controls is more likely to be requested during a long-running EAD outbreak.

Conditions for any permitted movement in this context will be developed using an emergency permit process. An emergency permit is a special permit that specifies strict legal requirements for an otherwise high-risk movement of an animal, to enable emergency veterinary treatment to be delivered, to enable animals to be moved for animal welfare reasons, or to enable any other emergency movement under exceptional circumstances. These permits are issued on a case-by-case basis under the authorisation of the relevant chief veterinary officer.

### Assumptions

- The proposed movement must not affect the status of declared areas and the outside area for both the origin and the destination.
- The proposed movement must not affect proof of freedom or market access.
- The proposed movement must not put the animal(s) in question at greater risk of infection, or negative impacts of control measures that may be imposed at the destination.
- The applicant must demonstrate that the movement is necessary for animal welfare or for breeding purposes that are essential to the functioning of regional captive breeding programs, where alternative measures are currently not available.
- The application will not be progressed if there are insufficient resources for drafting specific conditions for the movement or managing the movement (eg its preparation, the movement itself, monitoring at the destination) as required by the conditions.

Figure 4 shows a decision tree for variation to movement controls for RVAs.




**a** Vaccinated or recovered animals may fall in this category. Supporting information may be required, including vaccination history, laboratory testing and expert advice. It can be difficult to demonstrate immunity in particular species using unvalidated tests.

**Figure 4 Decision tree for issuing permits for movement of rare and valuable animals in an emergency animal disease outbreak**

# Appendix 1 Breeding nuclei

Breeding nuclei for the major livestock species are defined as follows:

- cattle: 8 cows and 1 bull (or artificial insemination (AI))[7]
- goats: 6 does and 1 buck[5]
- pigs: 3 sows and 1 boar (or AI)[5]
- sheep: 16 ewes and 1 ram[5]
- poultry: 5 hens and 2 cock birds
- horses: 6 mares and 1 stallion.

[7] UK FMD Breeds at Risk Register (www.ryelandfbs.com/RBST_brochure.pdf)

# Glossary

## Manual-specific

| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Breeding nucleus | The number of animals required to ensure a sustainable population for the premises (see Appendix 1). |
| Managed breeding program | A program in which an animal population is managed to maximise its genetic health. This includes individual identification, a robust recording system and regular external auditing of the program against its stated aim. |
| Poultry | All domesticated birds, including backyard poultry, used for the production of meat or eggs for consumption, for the production of other commercial products, for restocking supplies of game, or for breeding these categories of birds, as well as fighting cocks used for any purpose.<br><br>Birds that are kept in captivity for any reason other than those reasons referred to in the preceding paragraph, including those that are kept for shows, races, exhibitions, competitions or for breeding or selling these categories of birds as well as pet birds, are not considered to be poultry.[8] |

## General

| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Animal byproducts | Products of animal origin that are not for consumption but are destined for industrial use (eg hides and skins, fur, wool, hair, feathers, hoofs, bones, fertiliser). |

[8] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) (2014). *Terrestrial animal health code,* www.oie.int/international-standard-setting/terrestrial-code/access-online

| | |
|---|---|
| Animal Health Committee | A committee whose members are the chief veterinary officers of the Commonwealth, states and territories, along with representatives from the Australian Animal Health Laboratory (CSIRO) and the Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment. There are also observers from Animal Health Australia, Wildlife Health Australia, and the New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries. The committee provides advice to the National Biosecurity Committee on animal health matters, focusing on technical issues and regulatory policy.<br>*See also* National Biosecurity Committee |
| Animal products | Meat, meat products and other products of animal origin (eg eggs, milk) for human consumption or for use in animal feedstuff. |
| Approved disposal site | A premises that has zero susceptible livestock and has been approved as a disposal site for animal carcasses, or potentially contaminated animal products, wastes or things. |
| Approved processing facility | An abattoir, knackery, milk processing plant or other such facility that maintains increased biosecurity standards. Such a facility could have animals or animal products introduced from lower-risk premises under a permit for processing to an approved standard. |
| At-risk premises | A premises in a restricted area that contains a live susceptible animal(s) but is not considered at the time of classification to be an infected premises, dangerous contact premises, dangerous contact processing facility, suspect premises or trace premises. |
| Australian Chief Veterinary Officer | The nominated senior veterinarian in the Australian Government Department of Agriculture and Water Resources who manages international animal health commitments and the Australian Government's response to an animal disease outbreak.<br>*See also* Chief veterinary officer |
| AUSVETPLAN | *Aus*tralian *Vet*erinary Emergency *Plan*. Nationally agreed resources that guide decision making in the response to emergency animal diseases (EADs). It outlines Australia's preferred approach to responding to EADs of national significance, and supports efficient, effective and coherent responses to these diseases. |
| Carcase | The body of an animal slaughtered for food. |
| Carcass | The body of an animal that died in the field. |

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|---|---|
| Chief veterinary officer (CVO) | The senior veterinarian of the animal health authority in each jurisdiction (national, state or territory) who has responsibility for animal disease control in that jurisdiction.<br>*See also* Australian Chief Veterinary Officer |
| Compartmentalisation | The process of defining, implementing and maintaining one or more disease-free establishments under a common biosecurity management system in accordance with OIE guidelines, based on applied biosecurity measures and surveillance, to facilitate disease control and/or trade. |
| Compensation | The sum of money paid by government to an owner for livestock or property that are destroyed for the purpose of eradication or prevention of the spread of an emergency animal disease, and livestock that have died of the emergency animal disease.<br>*See also* Cost-sharing arrangements, Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement |
| Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases (CCEAD) | The key technical coordinating body for animal health emergencies. Members are state and territory chief veterinary officers, representatives of CSIRO-AAHL and the relevant industries, and the Australian Chief Veterinary Officer as chair. |
| Control area (CA) | A legally declared area where the disease controls, including surveillance and movement controls, applied are of lesser intensity than those in a restricted area (the limits of a control area and the conditions applying to it can be varied during an incident according to need). |
| Cost-sharing arrangements | Arrangements agreed between governments (national and state/territory) and livestock industries for sharing the costs of emergency animal disease responses.<br>*See also* Compensation, Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement |
| Dangerous contact animal | A susceptible animal that has been designated as being exposed to other infected animals or potentially infectious products following tracing and epidemiological investigation. |
| Dangerous contact premises (DCP) | A premises, apart from an abattoir, knackery or milk processing plant (or other such facility) that, after investigation and based on a risk assessment, is considered to contain a susceptible animal(s) not showing clinical signs, but considered highly likely to contain an infected animal(s) and/or contaminated animal products, wastes or things that present an unacceptable risk to the response if the risk is not addressed, and that therefore requires action to address the risk. |

| | |
|---|---|
| Dangerous contact processing facility (DCPF) | An abattoir, knackery, milk processing plant or other such facility that, based on a risk assessment, appears highly likely to have received infected animals, or contaminated animal products, wastes or things, and that requires action to address the risk. |
| Declared area | A defined tract of land that is subjected to disease control restrictions under emergency animal disease legislation. There are two types of declared areas: restricted area and control area. |
| Decontamination | Includes all stages of cleaning and disinfection. |
| Depopulation | The removal of a host population from a particular area to control or prevent the spread of disease. |
| Destroy (animals) | To kill animals humanely. |
| Disease agent | A general term for a transmissible organism or other factor that causes an infectious disease. |
| Disease Watch Hotline | 24-hour freecall service for reporting suspected incidences of exotic diseases – 1800 675 888. |
| Disinfectant | A chemical used to destroy disease agents outside a living animal. |
| Disinfection | The application, after thorough cleansing, of procedures intended to destroy the infectious or parasitic agents of animal diseases, including zoonoses; applies to premises, vehicles and different objects that may have been directly or indirectly contaminated. |
| Disinsectation | The destruction of insect pests, usually with a chemical agent. |
| Disposal | Sanitary removal of animal carcasses, animal products, materials and wastes by burial, burning or some other process so as to prevent the spread of disease. |
| Emergency animal disease | A disease that is (a) exotic to Australia or (b) a variant of an endemic disease or (c) a serious infectious disease of unknown or uncertain cause or (d) a severe outbreak of a known endemic disease, and that is considered to be of national significance with serious social or trade implications.<br>*See also* Endemic animal disease, Exotic animal disease |

| | |
|---|---|
| Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement | Agreement between the Australian and state/territory governments and livestock industries on the management of emergency animal disease responses. Provisions include participatory decision making, risk management, cost sharing, the use of appropriately trained personnel and existing standards such as AUSVETPLAN.<br>*See also* Compensation, Cost-sharing arrangements |
| Endemic animal disease | A disease affecting animals (which may include humans) that is known to occur in Australia.<br>*See also* Emergency animal disease, Exotic animal disease |
| Enterprise | *See* Risk enterprise |
| Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) | A serological test designed to detect and measure the presence of antibody or antigen in a sample. The test uses an enzyme reaction with a substrate to produce a colour change when antigen–antibody binding occurs. |
| Epidemiological investigation | An investigation to identify and qualify the risk factors associated with the disease.<br>*See also* Veterinary investigation |
| Epidemiology | The study of disease in populations and of factors that determine its occurrence. |
| Exotic animal disease | A disease affecting animals (which may include humans) that does not normally occur in Australia.<br>*See also* Emergency animal disease, Endemic animal disease |
| Exotic fauna/feral animals | *See* Wild animals |
| Fomites | Inanimate objects (eg boots, clothing, equipment, instruments, vehicles, crates, packaging) that can carry an infectious disease agent and may spread the disease through mechanical transmission. |
| General permit | A legal document that describes the requirements for movement of an animal (or group of animals), commodity or thing, for which permission may be granted without the need for direct interaction between the person moving the animal(s), commodity or thing and a government veterinarian or inspector. The permit may be completed via a webpage or in an approved place (such as a government office or commercial premises). A printed version of the permit must accompany the movement. The permit may impose preconditions and/or restrictions on movements.<br>*See also* Special permit |

| | |
|---|---|
| In-contact animals | Animals that have had close contact with infected animals, such as noninfected animals in the same group as infected animals. |

# Abbreviations

| Abbreviation | Full title |
|---|---|
| AAHL | Australian Animal Health Laboratory |
| AUSVETPLAN | Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan |
| CCEAD | Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases |
| CSIRO | Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation |
| CVO | chief veterinary officer |
| EAD | emergency animal disease |
| EADRA | Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement |
| EADRP | Emergency Animal Disease Response Plan |
| NMG | National Management Group |

# Further reading

Animal Health Australia (2014). *Enterprise manual: Zoos* (Version 3.0). Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN), Edition 3, Agriculture Ministers' Forum, Canberra, ACT. www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/our-publications/ausvetplan-manuals-and-documents/

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